

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 01275 01 OF 03 262219Z

72

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 1275

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS,

FEBRUARY 26, 1974 (SALT TWO - 383)

REF: SALT TWO GENEVA 1270

1. SUMMARY. POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS AND CONVERSATIONS AT U.S.-HOSTED LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF SOVIET DELEGATION TODAY PRODUCED, ASIDE FROM A FEW QUESTIONS, RELATIVELY LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT BY SOVIETS ON U.S. CONCEPT OF ICBM MIRV-ED THROW-WEIGHT PUT FORWARD AT TODAY'S MEETING. SOVIETS SUGGESTED THEY NEEDED TIME TO STUDY CONCEPT AND WISHED TO HEAR MORE ABOUT U.S. PROPOSALS BEFORE COMMENTING. THERE WERE DISCUSSIONS AS WELL OF VERIFICATION, THROW-WEIGHT, U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY AND MLBM'S. SHCHUKIN ALSO DISCUSSED WITH NITZE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN SOVIET HIERARCHY. END SUMMARY.

2. U.S. ICBM MIRV CONCEPT. SHCHUKIN (TO NITZE, A-511) SAID HE HAD LISTENED WITH CARE TO AMB JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF TODAY. IT SEEMED TO HIM TO BE INCOMPLETE; IT DEALT ONLY WITH ONE CATEGORY OF MISSILES -- MIRV-ED ICBM'S. IT SEEMED TO HIM THERE WERE FOUR CATEGORIES TO BE CONSIDERED; MIRV-ED ICBM'S, UNMIRV-ED ICBM'S, MIRV-ED SLBM'S, AND UNMIRV-ED SLBM'S. NITZE REPLIED THAT AMB JOHNSON HAD MADE CLEAR THE U.S. VIEWPOINT THAT ICBM'S AND PARTICULARLY MIRV-ED

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SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 01275 01 OF 03 262219Z

ICBM'S WERE THE MOST IMMEDIATELY DESTABILIZING ELEMENT. HE FURTHER

POINTED OUT THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD SUGGESTED MUTUAL DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPT HE HAD OUTLINED TODAY; SUCH A DISCUSSION WOULD REQUIRE PARTICIPATION BY BOTH SIDES.

3. SHCHUKIN SUGGESTED THAT IN SUCH A DISCUSSION IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ASSOCIATE WITH EACH TYPE OF MISSILE ITS VOLUME, THROW-WEIGHT AND THE NUMBER OF MIRV'S. NITZE ASKED SHCHUKIN HOW, AS A FIRST STEP, WE SHOULD GO ABOUT IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUAL MISSILE SYSTEMS, NOTING THAT IN THE U.S. PRESS THERE WERE REFERENCES TO SS-9'S AND SS-11'S AND, WITH RESPECT TO THEIR NEW ICBM SYSTEMS, TO SS-16, SS-17, SS-18, AND SS-19'S. WOULD REFERENCE TO THEIR SYSTEMS IN THESE TERMS PRESENT A PROBLEM TO THEIR SIDE AND HOW COULD WE THEN DISCUSS THE THROW-WEIGHT OF OUR RESPECTIVE SYSTEMS.

4. SHCHUKIN INFERRED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF POINTS OF VIEW ON THEIR SIDE AS TO HOW PRECISE THEIR SIDE SHOULD BE IN DISCUSSING INDIVIDUAL MISSILE SYSTEMS; PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER TO RELATE THEIR SYSTEMS TO OURS. NITZE CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT IN ADDITION TO IDENTIFYING CLASSES OF MISSILES SUCH AS U.S. MINUTEMAN AND THEIR SS-11'S AND SS-9'S IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SUBCLASSES SUCH AS THEIR SS-11'S MOD I, II, AND III AND THEIR SS-9'S WITH ITS FOUR SUBCLASSES. SHCHUKIN ASKED WHETHER NITZE WAS REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO THOSE WHICH HAD A SINGLE RV, 2RV'S OR SOME OTHER NUMBER. IN RESPONSE, NITZE SAID THAT THE DESIGNATION OF THE SUBCLASS DID NOT INDICATE THE NUMBER OF RV'S ASSOCIATED WITH THAT SUBCLASS BUT DID INDICATE THE SUCCESSIVE MODIFICATION OF THE CLASS WHICH HAD BEEN TESTED AND DEPLOYED. SHCHUKIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD; ON THE U.S. SIDE THE DISTINCTION WOULD BE BETWEEN MINUTEMAN I, MINUTEMAN II, AND MINUTEMAN III.

5. WITH RESPECT TO THEIR SS-9 MOD IV, NITZE SAID IT WAS THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS SUBCLASS LAUNCHED 3 RV'S. SHCHUKIN AGREED. NITZE ASKED WHETHER THEY CONSIDERED THIS SUBCLASS TO BE INDIVIDUALLY TARGETABLE OR NOT. SHCHUKIN SAID THIS WAS A QUESTION HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO ANSWER.

6. FOLLOWING THE MORNING MEETING, TRUSOV (TO ROWNY, A-510) SAID THAT HE HAD NO ENTHUSIASM FOR TODAY'S U.S. STATEMENT ON ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT. HE SAID WE WERE TRYING TO NARROW THE PROBLEM BY TALKING TO FIRST-STRIKE AND RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES. HE SAID THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 01275 01 OF 03 262219Z

PROBLEM IS MUCH BROADER. HE FELT GIVING HIGHEST PRIORITY TO ICBM'S WAS UNFOUNDED, SINCE SLBM'S AND BOMBERS ALSO COME INTO THE EQUATION. HE SAID WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO LIMIT FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN CONCEPTS WHICH FAVOR US. ROWNY WELCOMED TRUSOV'S DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS, SAYING IT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO DISCERN WHAT THEIR STRATEGIC CONCEPTS WERE. ROWNY SAID THAT IF HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK INTO WHICH THEY FIT THEIR FORCES HE MIGHT LEARN HOW THEY DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF DETERRENCE

AND STABILITY.

7. AT LUNCH, TRUSOV REPEATED HIS THEME (TO ROWNY) THAT HAVING NARROWED THE DISCUSSION TO THE THREE CENTRAL SYSTEMS, THE U.S. WAS NOW ATTEMPTING TO EXCLUDE SLBM'S AND HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH WERE ALSO IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. HE SAID THAT THE FACT THAT THE U.S. HAD EQUIPPED HALF OF ITS SSBN FORCE WITH POSEIDON MIRV'S MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. HAD EXCLUDED THESE FROM THIS MORNING'S STATEMENT. IN RESPONSE, ROWNY POINTED OUT THAT ICBM'S WERE THE MOST POWERFUL AND MOST DESTABILIZING FORCES AND THAT WE WERE CONFRONTED WITH A TIME-SENSITIVE PROBLEM WHICH WAS WITHIN OUR GRASP TO CAPTURE IF WE CHOSE TO DO SO. TRUSOV ASKED IF THE U.S. WAS PROPOSING THAT AN EQUAL NUMBER OF ICBM'S BE MIRV-ED. ROWNY REPLIED NO. IT WAS EQUAL THROW-WEIGHTS OF ICBM MIRV'S THAT THE U.S. HAD IN MIND.

8. GRINEVSKY (TO KLOSSON, A-509) SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND

SECRET

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PAGE 01 SALT T 01275 02 OF 03 262247Z

72

ACTION SS-30

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 1275

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

CONTRADICTIONS IN AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT AT THE MEETING EARLIER TODAY AND REFERRED TO THE SENTENCE IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH THAT SAID IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER NOT ONLY THE NUMBER OF ICBM'S BUT ALSO THEIR DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY, IN PARTICULAR THEIR MIRV POTENTIAL. HE SAID THAT THIS INDICATED THAT THE U.S. HAD IN MIND A NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON ICBM'S. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT THE REFERENCE ACTUALLY REFERRED TO THE CONCEPT PUT FORWARD BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON LAST FRIDAY CONCERNING AN AGGREGATE CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF

CENTRAL STRATEGIC ARMS. THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL TODAY HAD BEEN CONCERNED SOLELY WITH THE CONCEPT OF AN EQUAL AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S WITH MIRV'S.

9. KLOSSON SAID THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD NOT YET COMPLETED THE EXPOSITION OF THE U.S. POSITION AND, AS THE AMBASSADOR ALREADY SAID, HE WOULD CONTINUE TO SPELL OUT IN GREATER DETAIL THE CONCEPTS AS WE SAW THEM. GRINEVSKY INTERJECTED THAT PERHAPS HE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE FULL AMERICAN POSITION HAD BEEN LAID ON THE TABLE BEFORE CONTINUING WITH THE DISCUSSION OF THE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL MADE TODAY. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT GRINEVSKY'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE SENTENCE IN AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT THIS MORNING INDICATED IT WOULD STILL BE USEFUL TO EXPLORE THIS IMPORTANT CONCEPT SO THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE A FULL AND CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAD IN MIND.

10. VERIFICATION. IN RESPONSE TO GRINEVSKY'S QUESTION (A-509)
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SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 01275 02 OF 03 262247Z

RE VERIFICATION, KLOSSON STATED THAT THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THIS AS A SOMPLEX REQUIRING AN ENERGETIC EFFORT BY BOTH SIDES. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON WOULD ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT A A LATER SESSION, HOWEVER IT WAS NECESSARY TO POINT OUT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ENJOYED AN ADVANTAGE IN THE AVAILABILITY OF OPEN AMERICAN SOURCES, INCLUDING THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, WHICH IN EFFECT DETAILED THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES. GRINEVSKY THEN SAID THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT IS AVAILABLE IN OPEN SOURCES THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE USSR COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO RELY ON SUCH SOURCES. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT GRINEVSKY WAS UNDERLINING THE POINT PREVIOUSLY MADE THAT THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION WOULD REQUIRE A SERIOUS JOINT EFFORT BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

11. THROW-WEIGHT. NITZE (TO SHCHUKIN, A-512) REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT IN AMB JOHNSON'S PRESENTATION OF THIS MORNING HE HAD OFFERED A DEFINITION OF THROW-WEIGHT. NITZE ASKED SHCHUKIN WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THERE WERE TO BE A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS TO DEVELOP A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF THROW-WEIGHT. SHCHUKIN INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT THINK SO; HE THOUGHT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE DIFFEREING SIGNIFICANCE OF THROW-WEIGHT FOR THE TWO SIDES. HE AGAIN MADE THE POINT THAT THE VOLUME OF THEIR MISSILES OF A GIVEN CLASS WAS LARGER THAN THE VOLUME OF THE COMPARABLE CLASS OF MISSILES ON OUR SIDE. NITZE AGAIN WENT THROUGH THE EXPOSITION THAT A VOLUME COMPARISON WAS MUCH LESS TO THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET SIDE THAN A THROW-WEIGHT COMPARISON. THEIR MISSILES WERE, BY AND LARGE, LIQUID MISSILES, WHILE THE U.S. TYPES WERE, BY AND LARGE, SOLID MISSILES. SOLID MISSILES OF THE SAME THROW-WEIGHT WERE SMALLER IN VOLUME THAN LIQUID MISSILES. EVEN IN COMPARING SOLID MISSILES, U.S. MISSILES, IN GENERAL, PRODUCED MORE THROW-WEIGHT PER UNIT OF VOLUME THAN DID SOVIET MISSILES. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT

THIS WAS CORRECT BUT THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE A DIFFERENT POINT AND THAT WAS THAT THE U.S. COULD BETTER EXPLOIT A GIVEN UNIT OF THROW-WEIGHT THAN COULD THE SOVIET SIDE. HE SUGGESTED THE U.S. COULD ACHIEVE BOTH BETTER ACCURACY AND BETTER WEIGHT TO YIELD RATIOS THAN COULD THE SOVIET SIDE.

12. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THEIR SIDE WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT AT A SUBSEQUENT SESSION ON THROW-WEIGHT. IF THEY DID SO, IT WAS LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD SUGGEST THAT NOT ONLY THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S AND SLBM'S BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BUT THAT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 01275 02 OF 03 262247Z

THE THROW-WEIGHT EQUIVALENT OF ALL OTHER STRATEGIC ARMS ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. NITZE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD BE REAL DIFFICULTIES IN ARRIVING AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FACTORS FOR DETERMINING SUCH EQUIVALENT THROW-WEIGHT. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE

INTO ACCOUNT FIRST OF ALL VIRTUAL ATTRITION, NOTING THAT HE AND HAROLD BROWN HAD DISCUSSED THIS POINT WITH SHCHUKIN AT A PREVIOUS PHASE OF SALT.

13. IN THAT DISCUSSION, NITZE SAID, ALL HAD AGREED THAT THE WARHEAD WEIGHT OF AN ASM MIGHT BE ONLY 10 PERCENT OF THE AGGREGATE WEIGHT OF THE ASM. SIMILARLY, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ACTUAL ATTRITION TO BE ANTICIPATED AGAINST UNLIMITED DEFENSES. THIS LATTER ESTIMATE WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE. SHCHUKIN RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR ICBM'S OR SLBM'S TO DESTROY AIR DEFENSES; IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO PUT THEM UNDER GROUND. NITZE NOTED THAT AIR DEFENSES COULD BE MOBILE AND THEREFORE THEIR LOCATION UNDETERMINABLE BY THE OTHER SIDE. FURTHERMORE, ANY USE OF ICBM'S OR SLBM'S FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUBTRACTION FROM THOSE MISSILES OTHERWISE AVAILABLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES. SHCHUKIN VOLUNTEERED THAT AIR DEFENSES WERE, BY AND LARGE, CO-LOCATED WITH URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL CENTERS AND IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO TAKE THEM OUT IF ONE WERE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID SUCH

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PAGE 01 SALT T 01275 03 OF 03 262234Z

ACTION SS-30

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 1275

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

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14. NITZE RECALLED THAT IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION THEY HAD BEGUN A DISCUSSION AS TO HOW ONE COULD ASSOCIATE A GIVEN THROW-WEIGHT WITH A GIVEN TYPE OF MISSILE. SHCHUKIN HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO RELATE THROW-WEIGHT OF THEIR MISSILES TO THE THROW-WEIGHT OF U.S. MISSILES. NITZE ASKED WHETHER HE HAD IN MIND THAT WE MIGHT FOR INSTANCE ASSIGN ONE UNIT OF THROW-WEIGHT TO THE THROW-WEIGHT OF A MINUTEMAN III AND THEN ASSIGN APPROXIMATELY ONE UNIT TO AN SS-16. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE WAS NOT PERMITTED TO COMMENT ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF THEIR MISSILES.

15. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, NITZE ASKED HOW THEY COULD PROCEED WITH A USEFUL DISCUSSION OF THROW-WEIGHT; DID HE HAVE IN MIND THAT SEMENOV AND JOHNSON COULD LATER DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS. SHCHUKIN SAID NO, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE AT A HIGHER LEVEL OF AUTHORITY THAN SEMENOV. WHEN ASKED IF THIS MIGHT BE AT THE LEVEL OF SMIRNOV, SHCHUKIN REPLIED "PERHAPS." SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE HAD SPENT 5 HOURS IN DISCUSSION WITH SMIRNOV AND THOUGHT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS POINT OF VIEW; HOWEVER, "HE HAD ONLY ONE NECK."

16 U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY. GRINEVSKY (TO KLOSSON, A-509) REFERRED TO WHAT HE CALLED STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER CALLING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES. IN RESPONSE, KLOSSON POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS
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SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 01275 03 OF 03 262234Z

IMPORTANT TO READ THE ACTUAL TEXTS OF THESE STATEMENTS AND NOT SIMPLY RELY UPON PRESS REPORTS REGARDING THEM. PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS ANNUAL FOREIGN POLICY REPORT DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS HAD CALLED FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH OR GREATER OPTIONS IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY THAN SEEM TO BE AFFORDED BY SIMPLY A COUNTER-VALUE APPROACH. THUS, WHAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD SAID SHOULD NOT COME AS A SURPRISE TO GRINEVSKY AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE ANY REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC APPROACH.

SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT U.S. TARGETING POLICY WAS A SUBJECT INDEPENDENT OF SALT WHICH WOULD PLAY A ROLE IN GUIDING THE SIZING OF OUR FORCES.

17. GRINEVSKY THEN REFERRED TO THE EARLY SESSIONS OF SALT ONE WHEN, HE ALLEGED, THE U.S. DELEGATION HAD SHOWN INTENSE CONCERN OVER SOVIET INTENTIONS, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO A FIRST-STRIKE STRATEGY. IN RESPONSE, KLOSSON POINTED OUT THAT DIVING INTENTIONS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY WAS ALWAYS A COMPLICATED TASK. THE PRUDENT COURSE IS TO MEASURE THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE OTHER SIDE. U.S. PLANNERS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE SS-17 AND SS-19 CARRIED SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THROW-WEIGHT THAN THE SS-11 AND THAT THE SS-18 WAS LARGER THAN THE SS-9. GRINEVSKY INTERJECTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DETERMINES THE SIZE OF ITS FORCES IN RELATION TO ITS DEFENSE NEEDS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE DID NOT DENY THAT HIS STATEMENT INCLUDED A CALCULATION OF ALL POSSIBLE ENEMIES.

18. MLBMS. GRINEVSKY (TO KLOSSON, A-509) SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE FEBRUARY RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS HAD MADE NO MENTION OF MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES. IN REPLY, KLOSSON SAID U.S. STILL REGARDS MLBMS AS PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS TO THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

19. OPINIONS IN SOVIET HIERARCHY. SHCHUKIN (TO NITZE, A-512) REFERRED AGAIN TO THE ARTICLE IN THE FEB. 25 EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE TO WHICH HE HAD REFERRED BEFORE LUNCH. HE SAID THE ARTICLE EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY WERE REAL. HE SAID HE HAD NOT MEANT TO EXPRESS AGREEMENT WITH THE SKEPTICISM; ON THE CONTRARY HE HAD MENTIONED THE ARTICLE BECAUSE IT HAD REFERRED TO SUCH DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE REAL. HE SAID THE MILITARY HAD A POINT OF VIEW WHICH DIFFERED RADICALLY FROM HIS OWN. HE SAID THERE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 01275 03 OF 03 262234Z

WERE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN HIGH POSITIONS WHOM HE FELT DISAGREED WITH THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW AND SHARED HIS GENERAL APPROACH. AS AN EXAMPLE, SOME OF THOSE WHO WERE CONCERNED WITH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION WERE IN THIS SECOND GROUP.

20. NITZE ASKED WHETHER SHCHUKIN WAS REFERRING TO USTINOV, SMIRNOV AND THEIR ASSOCIATES. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT MEN IN THEIR POSITION DO NOT SAY EXACTLY WHAT IS IN THEIR MINDS. HOWEVER IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE CLEARLY COGNIZANT OF THE FACT THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED THE POWER OF ITS OFFENSIVE FORCES THE U.S. WOULD RESPOND THERETO AND THAT EITHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE GAINED NOTHING FROM THE INCREASE OR ELSE IT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN VERY COSTLY ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS. HE SAID THAT USTINOV'S AND SMIRNOV'S VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ANY IDEALOGICAL DIFFERENCES WITH THEIR SENIOR ASSOCIATES, IT

MERELY SPRANG FROM A REALIZATION OF THE POTENTIAL COSTS INVOLVED. HE SAID HE HIMSELF FELT THAT THE CHANCES OF NUCLEAR WAR WERE MINISCULE AND THAT DIFFERENCES IN DEPLOYMENTS ON EITHER SIDE COULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT UPON THE OUTCOME. HOWEVER, HE WAS PERSUADED OF THE VALIDITY OF THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER CONCERNING THE IMPORTANCE NOT ONLY OF THE REALITIES OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BUT ALSO OF THEIR APPEARANCES. JOHNSON

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